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Abstract
Queensland’s 2017 state election resulted in Annastacia Palaszczuk’s Labor gov-
ernment being returned with a slim majority. While not a resounding victory, the
result seemingly vindicated the premier’s decision to head to an early election,
and reinforced her standing in a succession of opinion polls as ‘preferred pre-
mier’ for most voters. The result also halted the short sequence of Queensland
governments being voted out of office in no uncertain terms by a suppos-
edly volatile electorate. The extent to which Labor’s recent electoral success
in Queensland — and the quelling of that volatility — can be attributed to
Palaszczuk’s leadership is still open to debate. It is instructive, though, to note
the differences in leadership and campaigning styles between Palaszczuk and
her opponents, which saw her drag a decimated Labor Party back to office after
a single term in opposition, then saw it returned with a working parliamentary
majority. This article highlights those differences over the last term of gov-
ernment, contrasting the performance of the two major parties in Queensland
in terms of their leadership and election campaign approaches. The analysis
helps to explain some of the reasons for the respective parties’ recent electoral
showings.
Introduction
After Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk called an early state election for 25 November
2017, pundits in Queensland suggested that the result would be close and difficult
to predict.1 This was partly due to several novel factors in play at the election,
among them redrawn electoral boundaries, the addition of four new seats and the
reintroduction of compulsory preferential voting. On top of this, the ‘wildcard’
element of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) — stubbornly popular, partic-
ularly in the state’s regions — as well as prominent support in Brisbane for The
Greens contributed to persistently close and uncertain opinion poll positions for
the two major parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal National
Party (LNP).2 While Palaszczuk had mostly enjoyed higher personal ratings than
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her direct opponent in those same polls, it seemed that voters weren’t overly enam-
oured of either major party, or their leaders, at times lending an almost ambivalent
air to the election.3
What the 2017 election ultimately delivered, to quote Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull, was both ‘continuity and change’.4 Palaszczuk’s Labor administration,
previously governing in minority, was returned to office with a very slim major-
ity, delivering the Premier something of the ‘stability’ she desired. After successive
election defeats for the LNP, change came when Tim Nicholls gave up the party
leadership, paving the way for his deputy, Deb Frecklington, to become that party’s
first female leader. While opposition leaders in Queensland have not always auto-
matically resigned following an election defeat — Lawrence Springborg was the last
to do so in 2009 — Nicholls’ resignation suggested that he shouldered the blame
for the loss, accepting his party’s dissatisfaction at a failure to oust what some had
depicted as an under-performing government. Conversely, Labor supporters were
quick to celebrate Palaszczuk’s performance as again delivering victory against
the odds. In terms of the next period of government, the longer significance of
Palaszczuk’s and Nicholls’ leadership and campaign efforts is still undecided. Their
respective performances, however, are examined here in the context of the state’s
most recent electoral and party dynamics, as a means by which both parties’ elec-
toral results and public standing might be analysed and explained.
In this context, it is also worth considering Queensland’s long-held reputation
for populist and authoritarian (and, until fairly recently, exclusively male) leaders
in a polity argued to be readily accepting of domineering leadership.5 This aspect of
the state’s political culture, long viewed by many local and interstate observers as
singularly ‘different’, evolved in response to frontier-like conditions and fluctuating
political allegiances, which prevailed from the colonial era onwards, witnessing
such notably strong-willed premiers as Sir Thomas McIlwraith and William Forgan
Smith.6 In the past half-century, Queensland has produced conspicuously populist
or authoritarian leaders (or both), such as Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Peter Beattie
and Campbell Newman. Yet the surprising result of the 2015 state election —
when Newman lost his own seat and his LNP government lost office — seemingly
indicated that the ‘strong man’ figure might be no longer so ‘naturally’ palatable to
Queensland’s voting populace, despite this long background.7
When Anna Bligh’s Labor government was re-elected in Queensland in 2009,
she set a precedent as the first female premier to win a state election, establishing
Queensland (150 years after its separation from New South Wales) as something of
a pioneer8 in a possibly more egalitarian modern body politic. It has been argued
since that the 2015 state election signalled a continued shift in voter attitudes in
Queensland towards a more consultative and approachable style of leadership,9 a
change manifested in rejecting the action-oriented ‘strong man’ for an emotionally
attuned ‘everyman’ (or woman) as leader. This was a space into which Annastacia
Palaszczuk strode comfortably, if initially perhaps by circumstance.
Party leadership in the ALP
Palaszczuk as opposition leader
The travails that beset the ALP in Queensland after the battering the party sus-
tained at the 2012 state election have been well documented.10 Ostensibly a
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backlash (though by no means voters’ only grievance) against Anna Bligh’s govern-
ment for its ‘breach of trust’ in selling off state-owned assets without forewarning,
the landmark election result delivered Campbell Newman’s LNP a record parlia-
mentary majority and reduced Labor’s representation to a miniscule seven mem-
bers. As the most experienced among the tiny caucus (bar her new deputy, party
veteran Tim Mulherin), the job was left to Palaszczuk as new leader to rebuild the
party’s stocks — and voters’ trust in it. But expectations of Palaszczuk’s tenure as
opposition leader were low, given Newman’s overwhelming command of numbers
in parliament.
Once settled into the role, however, it is fair to say she exceeded those expec-
tations. While winning admirers for calling attention to some of the Newman ad-
ministration’s ill-judged policy overreach, Palaszczuk trailed the premier’s personal
popularity ratings in opinion polling throughout the year leading to the 2015 state
election, barely narrowing that gap in the months beforehand.11 Despite this short-
coming, Palaszczuk’s grasp on the party leadership, and positive personal regard
among party supporters, were such that there was barely a mention of replacing her
with a potentially more electable contender. Still, when Newman caught most ob-
servers off guard in calling an early election for 31 January 2015, even Palaszczuk
reminded voters that she had likened the task of bouncing back from the 2012 state
election defeat to ‘climbing Mount Everest’.12
When the 2015 state election produced a huge two party-preferred swing that
unseated Newman’s government, it came as a surprise — and a concern to some —
that Palaszczuk should have benefited so much and so quickly from the palpable
anti-Newman sentiment expressed at the ballot box. Some past Labor figures even
opined that Palaszczuk’s bolstered caucus was ‘unprepared for government’, despite
containing more ministerial experience than Newman’s party room in 2012; voters
may be more willing presently to take a punt on ‘untried talent’ rather than reward
unpopular incumbents.13 But the manner of Palaszczuk’s becoming premier in a
hung parliament, after her unexpected rise to lead the ALP opposition, saw her
labelled an ‘accidental premier’, a largely unfair epithet that the LNP opposition
and critical local media put to frequent use.14
Palaszczuk as premier
As leader of a minority government, Palaszczuk promptly adopted a more mod-
erate, collaborative and ‘engaged’ style than her predecessor — willing to listen
to stakeholders, and communicate with voters and party colleagues through such
mechanisms as community cabinets and policy forums. Her government largely
avoided picking fights with ‘easy’ targets, and sought to mend fences with groups
across the public, judicial and business sectors (including previously sidelined union
groups). She also sought to accommodate some policy wishes of the Katter’s Aus-
tralian Party (KAP) crossbenchers, in stark contrast to Newman — though not
without disagreements (and a few lost votes on the floor of parliament) over cer-
tain areas of regional and energy policy.15
From its first budget in mid-2015, Palaszczuk’s government commenced some
important and well-received initiatives, the most prominent being the ‘Advance
Queensland’ grants program. With its focus on entrepreneurialism, research,
science and technology, and ‘industries of the future’, the initiative echoes
strains (heard less often) from Prime Minister Turnbull about the importance of
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embracing innovation. Advance Queensland also — and quite deliberately — harks
back to the signature ‘Smart State’ agenda of Peter Beattie’s government, giving the
premier a proactive agenda upon which to hang her hat. Disappointingly for some,
though, Palaszczuk’s government has been conservative in its overall economic ap-
proach — probably reflecting the state’s still heavily indebted financial position —
and criticised from various quarters over its ‘Jekyll & Hyde’ handling of the Adani
Carmichael coal mine proposal for the Galilee Basin.16 This has provided the op-
position with opportunities to question Palaszczuk’s commitment to ‘job-creating
investment’ amid accusations of worrying more about a supposed leadership threat
from deputy premier (and left faction leader) Jackie Trad, and negative reaction
from Greens supporters in Brisbane seats.
Repeated opposition depictions of the premier leading an overly cautious ‘do
nothing’ government gained traction in the public arena, reinforced by numerous
government-instigated inquiries and reviews (such as of the long-delayed cross-river
rail proposal), giving Palaszczuk’s leadership an appearance of ‘indecision’. This
was compounded by regular criticisms of the Labor government being ‘beholden’
to the union movement, after its active campaign to remove Newman’s LNP at the
2015 election.17 Besides these barbs, the premier and a few cabinet colleagues have
had to wear the fallout from occasional blunders, perhaps the worst of which were
ongoing train system failures in the public transport-dependent capital (somewhat
galling for Palaszczuk as former Bligh government transport minister). The premier
managed her way more or less successfully through these and other administrative
hurdles, but did lose a measure of public trust when in 2016 she oversaw late-night
amendments to the state’s voting rules without warning or consultation.18
Party leadership in the LNP
The ‘strong’ leader undone
Whereas the ALP has enjoyed the stability of unbroken leadership for six years, the
LNP has endured something of a ‘revolving door’ leadership, with Deb Frecklington
the party’s fourth leader in three years. With Campbell Newman as premier (2012–
15), the LNP suffered a dramatic and costly loss of public support, in large part
because of a failure to heed expert advice from public service officials or seek
consultation with key institution leaders and stakeholders.19 In the fervour to adopt
Newman’s ‘Can Do’ approach to government, the party failed to demonstrate in
its single term that it was governing for more than just its ‘core constituencies’
and chief party allies. As premier, Newman discovered too late that relentlessly
portraying an image of strength would not in and of itself deliver popularity or
electability; rather, Newman’s ‘Can Do’ reputation was found wanting, and the
party’s next tier of senior figures were tarnished as a result.20
Perhaps as a salve to these wounds after the bruising 2015 state election result,
the leadership was passed to Lawrence Springborg, the party’s most experienced
member — and with a profile that predated the Newman-led years. As a healing
gesture, it was symbolic that the task of repair should fall to one of the chief
architects of the Liberal and National Parties’ 2008 merger to form the LNP.
Yet, in his fifteen months as leader, Springborg struggled to land telling blows
on Palaszczuk or her ‘inexperienced’ minority government, and could not avoid
characterisation as a ‘nice-guy farm boy’ (an image dating from his 1989 entry to
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parliament as the state’s youngest elected member) whose manner often sat uneasily
with urban voters.21 The ‘taint’ of the fallen Newman government followed him
too, in the shape of troubling revelations at the 2015–16 inquiry into the closure
of the Barrett Adolescent Centre while he was health minister.
Changing horses and courses
Agitation within the party for leadership change became public in early 2016,
when Everton MP and former housing minister Tim Mander was revealed as head
of an attempted but ultimately aborted challenge to Springborg. The ensuing calm
lasted only a few months, however, before change swept through and installed Tim
Nicholls and Deb Frecklington as leader and deputy, replacing a discarded Spring-
borg as well as his deputy, John-Paul Langbroek (himself a former LNP leader,
deposed in favour of Campbell Newman — then not even an elected member of
parliament — in 2011). At the time, former Newman government treasurer Nicholls
appeared to LNP MPs to be a preferable alternative to the supposedly ‘plodding’
and ‘unelectable’ Springborg. This reverted to the pre-eminence of ‘urban Liberals’
over the merged party’s rural and regional representatives and constituents. For the
next eighteen months, Nicholls would attempt to rise above his past as a senior
member of the Newman administration, and the public face of its roundly rejected
asset privatisation agenda.22
More than rumblings over sliding polls for ‘preferred premier’,23 the LNP lead-
ership spill indicated continuing disquiet over which ‘partner’ should dominate
the party, and which ‘personality’ should lead (it possibly also indicated a lack of
new ‘talent’ with leadership potential coming through its ranks). This disquiet also
reflected an ongoing tendency in Queensland, as in other state and federal juris-
dictions, for parties to be reactive to negative poll results focused on the leader.
Ultimately, though, the move against Springborg revealed an inherent tension in
Queensland’s conservative politics, where the ‘city–country divide’ has been a prob-
lematic issue for both major parties, but particularly so for the LNP and its pre-
decessor parties.24 This was witnessed in the recent re-emergence of the ‘separate
statehood’ proposition in northern and rural parts of Queensland, with state and
federal LNP MPs coming down on either side of arguments for or against the idea.25
It was also reflected in the Newman administration’s pitch to the regional conser-
vative electorate, with an oft-repeated dedication to support the traditional primary
and service-based industries (mining, agriculture, tourism, and construction) repre-
sented in its ‘four pillars’ economic mantra. Springborg and then Nicholls — who,
as Newman’s treasurer, oversaw development of this economic agenda — followed
suit from 2015 onwards, though saw the wisdom in expanding that platform to in-
clude a broader range of economic sectors (rebadged from ‘pillars’ to ‘key drivers’) –
namely, manufacturing, education services, and science and technology. Given that,
by the time of Nicholls’ challenge, the LNP had maintained poll leads ahead of La-
bor in primary vote terms as often as not,26 it seemed that the party’s policy
messaging still appealed to a good portion of the electorate, despite its leadership
woes. The question was whether Nicholls — an ‘urbane’, former Liberal MP and
Brisbane City councillor — could sell the message to the party’s diverse and dis-
parate supporter base, when in the regions he sometimes struggled to achieve public
recognition or credibility.
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Election campaign approaches, 2015 and 2017
The last two election campaigns in Queensland took place in differing contexts and
featured very different electoral dynamics. In January 2015, the LNP government
sought to maintain much of its overwhelming parliamentary majority; almost three
years later, the minority ALP government sought to gain majority status. Both
campaigns, however, saw the government and the opposition at the time take,
for the most part, comparable and predictable approaches to their campaigning.
Typical of incumbent governments, both Newman and later Palaszczuk adopted
a negative tone to some campaign messages, warning of the ‘perils’ of change,
and offering the reassurance and ‘stability’ that their respective re-elections would
bring for voters. Similarly, both major parties in opposition at the last two elections
presented messaging that was comparatively more positive and hopeful about the
state’s prospects, if only voters would opt for changing governments.
Newman back to earth; Labor back from the brink
Where Newman’s earlier campaign strayed from the script, though, was his re-
verting to traditional ‘type’ as seemingly a populist bestowing largesse, simulta-
neously provoking confrontation with various public figures and interest groups,
and parroting his ‘strong’ catchphrase to the point of media ridicule. The largely
negative public response to this approach, and mocking media portrayal of it,
underline the influential role that party leaders play in setting the campaign tone
and potentially swaying the election result.27 The LNP’s 2015 state election cam-
paign and advertising unsurprisingly highlighted what were seen as the govern-
ment’s positives — having a ‘strong’ plan for a ‘strong’ economy; enforcing ‘strong’
laws for safer communities; and creating a less regulated operating environment
for business and industry to be more productive. All of this was safe territory
in which the government could contrast itself favourably with an understrength
opposition.
In the absence of a similarly detailed economic strategy, the ALP’s 2015 cam-
paign slogan, ‘A Better Way for Queensland’ (not unlike the LNP’s 2017 slogan,
‘Build a Better Queensland’), succinctly captured its aspirational campaign promise.
An emotional offering, this conjured visions of a ‘better’ life, of ‘better’ governance,
and presented the party leader in particular as positive and trustworthy. The cam-
paign approach fitted well with Palaszczuk’s personable, consultative, down-to-
earth image. This was highlighted especially when the Australia Day holiday fell
on the last Monday of the 2015 election campaign. Palaszczuk tapped into the
day’s emotion by attending a citizenship ceremony in her Inala electorate before
playing cricket barefoot in a park. She also fielded policy questions but, impor-
tantly, received positive media coverage with images of her looking relaxed and
approachable.28
2017: Shadow boxing and the One Nation ‘stalking horse’
This was an image that Palaszczuk and the ALP attempted to revive heading into
the 2017 state election campaign. Unlike her last outing, though, she carried the
baggage of having been in office for almost three years, leading a government some
depicted as listless and under-achieving.29 When the premier called an early elec-
tion for 25 November, this appeared to go against a promise to see out her full
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term, unless ‘extraordinary’ circumstances intervened. This immediately offered her
opponents a point upon which to criticise the premier, and depict her as ‘untrust-
worthy’ and ‘opportunistic’, in contrast to the open and honest image portrayed
during the prior campaign. Either way, the point didn’t linger and was overtaken
by other hurdles for Palaszczuk to overcome.
Throughout the four-week election campaign, a shift was evident from both
parties’ 2015 election campaigns, with Palaszczuk’s ALP adopting a cautionary,
more negative tone — urging voters to avoid another hung parliament in return
for Labor ‘stability’ (echoing Newman’s 2015 message) — while Nicholls’ LNP
abandoned ‘strong’ terminology, instead offering the positive promise of something
‘better’. Regardless of these differences, both leaders were keenly aware of rising
anti-major party sentiment in the electorate, threatening to block out campaign
messages to reportedly disaffected voters. This appeared inescapable when the
leaders were seemingly tailed for much of the campaign by Pauline Hanson —
despite not being a candidate at the election — and One Nation’s ‘Battler Bus’,
drawing attention to voter discontent in regions hit by high unemployment and
associated social ills.
In response, Palaszczuk and Nicholls campaigned energetically but, to some ob-
servers, delivered an uninspiring campaign. Requisite attention was paid to ‘bread
and butter’ issues such as cost of living pressures but, worryingly, little was offered
in the way of policy ‘vision’ or plans to improve the state’s finances.30 Both leaders
made themselves ‘small’ and mobile targets, which for Palaszczuk meant trying to
avoid campaign stops being hijacked by protestors opposed to the Adani coal mine.
In this she largely succeeded when, partway through the campaign, she abruptly
vowed to veto any federal infrastructure loan to Adani — a move seen as cyni-
cally opportunistic, but which seemed to have the desired effect. Facing criticism
from regional federal MPs, state Labor unsurprisingly drew attention to the fed-
eral Coalition government’s own woes, such as the ongoing High Court citizenship
drama.31
Palaszczuk had earlier taken the stance (‘arrogant’, according to her detractors)32
of ruling out dealing with minor parties over preferencing arrangements or post-
election haggling with the likes of One Nation. This allowed Palaszczuk a stark
point of difference to the LNP, a strategy also used against Newman and the
Palmer United Party presence in the 2015 election campaign. The premier made a
last-ditch appeal on election eve for wavering LNP supporters to vote for Labor —
‘just this time’ — but it is questionable whether her call was heeded.33 What might
have cut through to undecided voters in the hours prior to polling day were Labor
advertisements focused on Nicholls’ apparent readiness to form government with
One Nation’s support, and also — critically, in the capital — reminding voters of
his role as treasurer in the Newman government.
Nicholls ‘straddling a barbed-wire fence’
Throughout the campaign, Nicholls faced awkward questions about LNP plans to
‘swap’ preferences with One Nation, or to form minority government with that
party’s support. The media’s pursuit of these questions, to which Nicholls had
played a straight bat for much of the year, built to the point where he finally (and
realistically) admitted these as possibilities, after an unconvincing explanation at
a media-staged debate in the campaign’s final week. While during the year the
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LNP organisational wing and its MPs had presented a mostly disciplined front
behind Nicholls and his deputy, the leader’s stumble on this issue might have
proved a campaign turning point to some extent — then accentuated on election
eve by Nicholl’s fumbling television appearances over the same questions. These
episodes put a dent in the smile that Nicholls had worn stubbornly for the four-
week campaign, as part of his effort to appear positive and approachable (even
while engaging in the kind of for-the-camera campaign stunts for which Peter
Beattie was renowned).
Nicholls’ decision to tread a fine line between courting and snubbing One Nation
supporters ultimately cost the LNP votes in the state’s south-east corner, while his
‘urban Liberal’ image likely lost support in the regions. With a 7.6 per cent statewide
swing away from the LNP, his position as party leader was undoubtedly under
pressure. Nicholls acknowledged on election night that Queenslanders had voted
to ‘shake things up’, but for several days refused to concede defeat in the election,
instead waiting until final seat results were declared.34 Eventually, with the outcome
all but confirmed, Nicholls headed off any move against him from disgruntled party
colleagues by standing down as leader in the wake of the LNP’s disappointing
election result and voters’ rejection of his vision for a ‘better Queensland’.
Conclusion
Despite the potential for surprise, or even stalemate, the 2017 state election cam-
paign ended with Queenslanders returning Annastacia Palaszczuk’s Labor govern-
ment. The Premier overcame a confident and determined LNP opposition and sup-
posed ‘groundswell’ challenge from One Nation, becoming the first female leader
at state or federal level to win back-to-back elections. The protracted process of
counting postal and pre-poll votes took a fortnight after the polls had closed —
as it had after the 2015 state election — leaving many pondering in the interim
the supposed ‘instability’ of a hung parliament, and wondering who would best
be placed to lead a newly formed government. In the end, Palaszczuk’s message
of ‘stability’ resonated with enough voters — perhaps more so than the ‘chaos’
voters had been warned to expect from an LNP victory with potential One Nation
support.
All told, it was a lack-lustre and underwhelming campaign in terms of ‘big
issues’ and ‘big ideas’, after which Queenslanders were largely back where they
started, with little change in the relative positions of the major parties. The obvious
exception is a change in leadership dynamics after LNP MPs opted clearly for former
deputy leader Deb Frecklington in a party-room ballot. The task has been set for
her to drag the party’s stocks back up, especially in the regions, after successive
election setbacks. The LNP importantly sees her as palatable to voters and party
supporters in the state’s urban centres as well as in the regional/rural ‘heartland’
from where she hails. Significantly for the party, she is a female leader with perhaps
a similar down-to-earth and approachable manner to that of the premier.
In the wake of this result, Queensland’s recent electoral experience casts political
leadership in a different light — showing that it is as much a matter of voter
‘attachment’ as it is of policy substance and able governance. This has seen a
change from the ‘strong man’ to the attuned ‘everyman’ (or woman) as leader: a
shift in voters’ preferences, from which Newman was rejected in 2015 as a transitory
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departure. While Queenslanders have been seen to be harsh markers of government
performance, they’re clearly sensitive to the way their government is led. In this
regard, the role of the government’s (and the party’s) leader is important, as voters
seem wary of a return to a brash, ‘Newman-style’ leadership. The perception is that
Palaszczuk still presents as more of an authentic, communicative and reasonable
leader — valuable commodities when negotiating the government’s way through a
finely poised parliament. Whether the term ahead delivers ‘stability’ or ‘stagnation’
remains to be seen, but Palaszczuk’s majority Labor government would be keen
to avoid further characterisation as ‘do nothing’, and rather elicit plaudits as an
‘action’ administration.
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